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M
ost of the Tenth Federal Reserve District states
experienced a brain drain, or an outmigration
of highly educated people, during the last half of the
1980s. Fortunately, the recent tide of migration ap-
pears to have turned for some district states.1 Yet, it
is still important for policymakers to understand the
full impact of a brain drain on a state’s economy.
Highly educated people are prone to move, based on
their region’s economic performance relative to other
parts of the country. Thus, current favorable migra-
tion trends in the district could easily be reversed.
The exodus of highly educated workers from
1985 to 1990 cost the district about $1.6 billion
dollars annually—or 0.6 percent of its total personal
income per year. These losses from migration under-
cut states’ efforts at economic development and often
go unexamined. At the same time, states continue to
pour scarce resources into attracting industry. For
example, Alabama recently promised about $300
million in tax breaks and infrastructure outlays to lure
a new Mercedez-Benz automobile plant that would
hire 1,500 highly skilled workers. The brain drain in
Oklahoma, meanwhile, cost the state 6,800 highly
skilled workers per year from 1985 to 1990.
This article describes the district’s exodus of
highly educated workers—defined here as workers
who hold bachelor’s or higher college degrees. The first
section examines their occupations and income levels.
The second section discusses the economic impact of
the brain drain on each state in the Tenth District.
A brain drain profile
The experience of the Tenth District states in
the late 1980s provides a useful case study of a
regional brain drain. A significant amount of the
region’s highly educated workers moved to other
parts of the nation. Their exodus hurt the region’s
economy, an impact that is now shown in recently
released census data.2 Looking back, policymakers
might ask three questions about this exodus: what
industries did the highly educated migrants leave,
what were their occupations, and how much income
did they take with them? Armed with such informa-
tion, policymakers can assess the impact of a brain
drain and explore and evaluate steps to enhance the
region’s economic vitality.
As a whole, the number of highly educated
people moving out of the district states was greater
than those moving in, resulting in a net outflow of
about 85,000 highly educated workers from 1985 to
1990. Among district states, highly educated migrants
over age 25 made up a large portion of all migrants
in that age cohort (Chart 1). Two extreme cases in the
district are New Mexico and Missouri. In New Mexico,
the net gain in highly educated migrants exceeded the
overall net gain, indicating a loss of migrants with
less than a college-level education. In the opposite
extreme, Missouri gained migrants overall but regis-
tered a net loss of highly educated migrants, indicating
a large gain in migrants with less than a college-level
1 Recent migration trends appear especially favorable for Colorado
and New Mexico. For a detailed look at Tenth District migration trends,
see Miller, Glenn H., Jr. 1994. “People on the Move: Trends and Prospects
in District Migration Flows,” Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City,
Economic Review, Third Quarter.
2 The data for estimating net migration in the district states come from
the Public Use Microdata Sample (PUMS), prepared by the U.S. Bureau
of the Census. The PUMS data consist of a 5 percent sample of all the
household records collected by the Bureau in the 1990 decennial census.
Using this sample, people who lived in one state in 1985 but a different
state in 1990 are identified as migrants.
8education.3 The greatest net losses among the district
states occurred in Oklahoma.
What district industries lost highly
educated workers?
The brain drain varied in size across industries
in district states, with most states experiencing a loss
in nearly every industry (Table 1). Losses due to
migration were concentrated in some of the district’s
important industries: mining, construction, manufac-
turing, trade, and the financial and service industries.
Losses in the mining and construction industries were
the greatest in Colorado. Losses in manufacturing,
trade, and the financial and service industries were
greatest in Oklahoma.
What professions lost highly educated
workers?
As might be expected, most of the highly edu-
cated workers left white-collar jobs. They were man-
agers, executives, professionals, technicians, and
sales and administrative support workers (Table 2).
In Kansas, Missouri, and Nebraska, most of the
white-collar jobs vacated were “professional spe-
cialty” jobs: engineers, architects, teachers, scientists,
doctors, lawyers, and artists.
Some highly educated migrants left blue-collar
and service jobs. Most of the outflow of blue-collar
skilled workers took place in Colorado and Okla-
homa, where workers left precision production, craft,
and repair positions. Half of Colorado’s skilled blue-
collar losses were in the construction industry.
What were the incomes of the highly
educated migrants?
Because earnings typically rise with education,
most of the highly educated workers who left the
district had higher than average incomes, or yearly
total personal incomes above $25,000 (Table 3). The
income distribution among highly educated migrants
was the most unbalanced in Colorado and Missouri,
where over 80 percent of those leaving came from the
higher income group. In Kansas, New Mexico, and
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3 This finding repeats that found by Miller. The figures in this article
differ slightly from Miller’s because they exclude migration flows to and
from Puerto Rico and other outlying areas of the United States.
9Wyoming,  the income distribution among highly
educated migrants was more balanced, with workers
coming from each income group.
The incomes of highly educated migrants are
important to states. For example, even though Mis-
souri gained migrants overall from 1985 to 1990, it
still lost income because of its loss of highly educated
migrants with higher incomes. An exodus of higher
income migrants can dampen economic activity and
erode local tax bases.
The economic impact of the brain drain on
district states
Even though the migration patterns of most
district states appear to be improving recently, the
economic impact of the late 1980s brain drain is a
reminder of the need to retain these valuable human
resources. While many states may not have closely
examined the brain drain’s economic impact, most
states lost substantial income when their highly edu-
cated moved on to greener pastures (Table 4).
From 1985 to 1990, it is estimated that three of
the district’s seven states—Wyoming, Oklahoma,
and Nebraska—lost more than one percent of their
total personal income annually.4 By the same mea-
sure, Colorado, Missouri, and Kansas sustained mod-
erate losses. New Mexico was the only state that
gained a small amount of income.
Wyoming, the least populated of all district
Table 1
Net Migration by Industry, 1985-90
(Highly educated, age 25 and over)
Colorado Kansas Missouri Nebraska
New
Mexico Oklahoma Wyoming
Total -15,303 -6,179 -12,239 -13,006 4,918 -34,499 -8,631
Mining -1,668 -114 45 -87 83 -334 -130
Construction -2,350 -282 87 -132 -153 -1,418 7
Manufacturing -489 -1,539 -2,590 -2,353 -482 -5,728 -1,082
Nondurables -1,695 -552 -1,211 -576 203 -2,706 -426
Durables 1,206 -987 -1,379 -1,777 -685 -3,022 -656
TC&PU -781 322 -138 -247 -417 -1,666 -499
Trade -1,588 -1,147 -1,935 -959 725 -4,851 -996
Wholesale trade -910 184 -435 -314 -476 -1,773 -282
Retail trade -678 -1,331 -1,500 -645 1,201 -3,078 -714
Finance, insurance,
and real estate
-2,686 -106 -54 -1,259 -281 -3,907 -922
Services -3,515 -3,387 -6,266 -7,285 4,115 -16,353 -3,592
Government -315 -790 -1,299 -893 34 -1,556 -694
Notes: Total migrants include the following categories (not shown): agriculture, forestry, and fishing; military; unemployed; and
migrants not in the labor force. TC&PU is Transportation, Communication, and Public Utilities.
Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census, Public Use Microdata Sample.
4 The direct economic impact of the brain drain is estimated by
subtracting the total income of those moving out of each state from the
total income of those moving into each state over the period 1985 to 1990.
While the total personal income of migrants is known only for the year of
1989, an estimate of the income received over the 1985-90 period is made
by multiplying the 1989 income by 2.5, therefore assuming the average
move occurred 2.5 years into the period and that the migrant received a
constant level of income during those years.
10states, lost about $122 million per year to the brain
drain, amounting to 1.8 percent annually of the state’s
personal income (Table 4). The loss was due mainly
to the state’s sluggish economy in the mid- 1980s,
evidenced by its average annual employment decline
of 0.8 percent over the period. Wyoming’s highly
educated workers who left the state—mostly profes-
sionals, administrative personnel, and salespeople—
came from the manufacturing, trade, financial, and
service sectors. 
Oklahoma suffered the greatest loss of income
in the district—about $3.0 billion. The loss amounted
to an annual drain of 1.5 percent of the state’s per-
sonal income, mainly in response to its declining
energy sector (Table 4). Two-thirds of the state’s
highly educated migrants were executives, manag-
ers, and professionals, with the loss spread evenly
across all industries. Spurring Oklahoma’s exodus of
workers was the dramatic fall of oil prices in 1986,
which dampened the state’s economy. The state’s
average annual employment growth from 1985 to
1990 was a sluggish 0.5 percent, with many indus-
Table 2
Net Migration by Job, 1985-90
(Highly educated, age 25 and over)
Colorado Kansas Missouri Nebraska
New
Mexico Oklahoma Wyoming
Total migrants -15,303 -6,179 -12,239 -13,006 4,918 -34,499 -8,631
White-collar -13,816 -5,325 -12,981 -12,663 3,875 -32,219 -8,099
Managerial and professional
specialty -8,310 -4,986 -10,253 -9,900 2,890 -22,886 -5,367
Executive, administrative, 
and managerial -5,470 -764 -1,347 -2,818 -350 -7,474 -1,346
Professional specialty -2,840 -4,222 -8,906 -7,082 3,240 -15,412 -4,021
Technical sales, admin- 
istrative support -5,506 -339 -2,728 -2,763 985 -9,333 -2,732
Technicians and related 
support -1,182 575 -152 -361 -6 -2,460 -604
Sales occupations -3,218 -385 -2,073 -1,062 641 -4,082 -1,114
Administrative support, 
including clerical -1,106 -529 -503 -1,340 350 2,791 -1,014
Service occupations 591 -800 110 -185 267 -1,047 -98
Blue-collar -1,695 -411 230 -252 -221 -1,280 39
Precision production, craft, 
repair -1,137 -88 189 59 -239 -729 130
Operators, fabricators, laborers -558 -323 41 -311 18 -551 -91
Note: Total migrants include the following categories (not shown): agriculture, forestry, and fishing; military; unemployed; and 
migrants not in the labor force.
Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census, Public Use Microdata Sample.
11tries posting employment losses, primarily in mining,
manufacturing, construction, trade, and the financial
industries. 
Paradoxically, half of Oklahoma’s brain drain
losses were in services, particularly in business and
health services. Despite an overall job growth of 4.2
percent annually in the services sector, many highly
educated professionals in business and health ser-
vices relocated elsewhere, probably due to the weak-
ness in the state’s other industries during the period.
Nebraska lost about $246 million per year due
to its brain drain, or an annual 1.1 percent of personal
income, due largely to the departure of professionals,
executives, and managers. Nebraska’s losses were
concentrated in the durables manufacturing, finan-
cial, and service sectors. Over half of the state’s
service sector losses were in business and health
services, consisting mainly of professionals. Despite
Nebraska’s robust employment growth in services,
these professionals may have sought greater oppor-
tunities or richer amenities elsewhere.
Colorado’s brain drain cost the state about $320
million per year, or an annual 0.6 percent of personal
income, again due mainly to a slumping energy
sector. Many highly educated workers left the min-
ing, construction, nondurables manufacturing, trade,
financial, and services industries (Table 1). Mining
and construction losses were linked to Colorado’s
sliding employment in those industries from 1985 to
1990. Unlike the other district states, white-collar
workers who left Colorado tended to be executives
and managers rather than professionals. One fifth of
the executives and managers who left the state
worked in oil and gas extraction or construction.
While the state lost highly educated workers from
nondurables manufacturing (mainly printing and pub-
lishing and oil and gas extraction), it gained highly
educated workers in the durable goods sector, par-
ticularly in machinery and aerospace.
Missouri, the only district state to lose highly
educated residents while gaining migrants overall,
lost about $281 million per year in personal income,
or 0.4 percent of personal income annually. Mis-
souri’s brain drain consisted mainly of professionals
and salespeople. Losses were concentrated in manu-
facturing, retail trade, services, and the government
sector. The brain drain in manufacturing was prompted
by its slow employment growth, which averaged less
than 0.5 percent over the period.
Kansas sustained only moderate losses due to
the brain drain—about $71 million per year in per-
sonal income, or 0.2 percent of personal income
annually. The highly educated workers who left the
state were distributed equally among all income groups,
Table 3
Net Migration by Income Group, 1985-90
(Highly educated, age 25 and over)
Average 
income  Colorado Kansas Missouri Nebraska New Mexico Oklahoma Wyoming
Total -15,303 -6,179 -12,239 -13,006 4,918 -34,499 -8,631
Under $10,000 -1,608 82 873 -747 2,596 -4,376 -2,035
$10,000 to
$24,999 -881 -4,523 -2,996 -2,724 1,687 -9,270 -1,724
$25,000 or more -12,814 -1,738 -10,116 -9,535 635 -20,853 -4,872
$35,000 or more -8,378 -512 -6,695 -6,285 -429 -12,968 -2,774
$50,000 or more -4,278 -169 -4,244 -2,852 519 -6,648 -1,242
Note: Total personal income in 1989
Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census, Public Use Microdata Sample.
12thereby lessening its total income losses (Table 3).
The state’s brain drain consisted mainly of profes-
sionals in sectors that grew steadily over the period—
manufacturing, retail trade, and services. The brain
drain occurred in these sectors despite their healthy
employment growth, perhaps because migrants were
changing industries or finding greater opportunity
elsewhere.
New  Mexico was the only district state to enjoy
a brain gain, which caused an inflow of about $38
million per year, or 0.2 percent of personal income
annually (Table 4). New Mexico’s gain of highly
educated workers consisted nearly entirely of profes-
sionals concentrated in retail trade and services, par-
ticularly business services. The state’s service sector
employment grew an average 5.5 percent over the
period, reflecting briskly growing opportunities for
business service professionals in the state.
Conclusion
Most of the district’s states suffered losses from
1985 to 1990 due to an outmigration of highly educated
workers. The district’s brain drain was concentrated
in several important industries and occupations and
in higher income groups. For some district states, the
loss was significant when measured by the income of
the workers who left. A persistent loss of highly
educated workers can sap a state’s economic vitality
by draining its pool of highly trained workers, eroding
tax bases, and dampening related economic activity.
Even though recent migration trends suggest
the tide may be turning for the better for some district
states, policymakers can take steps to prevent future
outflows. Attracting and retaining highly educated
workers are important for promoting economic develop-
ment and strengthening the district’s economic health.
This suggests that to prevent a future brain drain
policymakers may want to not only improve eco-
nomic opportunities, but also enhance quality of life
factors, such as schools, public services and safety,
and the environment. 
Deron Ferguson is a research associate at the Federal Reserve Bank of
Kansas City.
Table 4
Income Losses Due to Migration from Tenth District States, 1985-90
(Highly educated, age 25 and over; millions of dollars)
















Colorado 106,011 $3,325.9 121,314 $3,966.0 -$640.1 -$1,600.0 -0.6
Kansas 56,193 1,801.7 62,372 1,943.2 -141.5 -353.8 -0.2
Missouri 84,572 2,668.2 96,811 3,229.3 -561.2 -1,403.0 -0.4
Nebraska 28,637 834.6 41,643 1,326.9 -492.3 -1,230.8 -1.1
New Mexico 40,860 1,207.4 35,942 1,130.9 76.5 191.3 0.2
Oklahoma 40,593 1,208.5 75,092 2,415.2 -1,206.8 -3,016.9 -1.5
Wyoming 9,448 239.9 18,079 484.0 -244.1 -610.2 -1.8
* Assumes migration 2.5 years into period and constant income.
Note: TPI is total personal income.
Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census, Public Use Microdata Sample.
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